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Gilbert: The Law and Economics of Entrenchment

THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
ENTRENCHMENT
Michael D. Gilbert*
Should law respond readily to society’s evolving views,
or should it remain fixed? This is the question of
entrenchment, meaning the insulation of law from
change through supermajority rules and other
mechanisms. Entrenchment stabilizes law, which
promotes reliance and predictability, but it also
frustrates democratic majorities. Legal scholars have
long studied this tension but made little progress in
resolving it.
This Article considers the problem from the perspective
of law and economics. Three arguments follow. First,
majority rule can systematically harm society—even
when voters are rational (i.e., not passionate) and no
intense minority is present. This is because of a collective
action problem created by transition costs. Second,
entrenchment is unnecessary when bargaining is easy,
but it offers a second-best solution when bargaining is
hard. This helps explain why some laws are entrenched
but not others. Third, the optimal degree of
entrenchment depends on a distinction existing
scholarship ignores: whether the transition costs
associated with a change in law are variable or fixed.
Given variable costs, the argument for entrenchment is
even stronger than scholars realize. But given fixed costs,
the argument weakens. To overcome fixed costs,
outdated laws require major change, but entrenchment
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encourages only minor change. This mismatch relates to
an age-old question: when, if ever, should judges update
entrenched law through interpretation? In one sense,
judges can beneficially update in a way that democracy
cannot.
These ideas cast doubt on work by originalists, living
constitutionalists, and others. They have implications
for legal design and constitutional law, and they plant
seeds for a new and fruitful field: the law and economics
of entrenchment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Can one generation bind another? Thomas Jefferson thought the
answer no, arguing that “[e]very constitution[,] . . . and every law,
naturally expires at the end of 19 years.”1 James Madison disagreed,
contending that making law “too mutable” would invite disorder
and violence.2 Each generation, Madison wrote, gives “tacit
assent . . . to established Constitutions and laws.”3 These titans
confronted a foundational question: how changeable should law be?
Should it respond readily to society’s evolving views, or should it
remain fixed? This is the question of entrenchment.
Entrenchment pits constitutionalism against democracy, and it
runs through legal debates old and new, from constitutional design
and judicial review to the countermajoritarian difficulty.
Constitutions, treaties, and other laws feature entrenchment in
fact. Entrenchment goes to the heart of contemporary, burning
debates. Can the British exit the European Union—and unwind a
lot of law—with a bare majority vote?4 Must we amend the
Constitution to reform the Electoral College, which has recently
produced anti-democratic results?5
Given the stakes, one might suppose that jurists have a
well-developed theory of entrenchment. But this is wrong. Scholars
have made extensive arguments but little progress. They “place one
or the other value—legal stability or democracy—in the foremost
position” and make their normative case,6 but they offer no
mechanism for reconciling these competing values or determining
the best level of entrenchment in practice.
This Article applies law and economics to the problem. It begins
with a fundamental idea in democratic theory. Suppose a majority
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 454, 459 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
2 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 147, 148 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961).
3 Id. at 149.
4 See, e.g., Kenneth Rogoff, Britain’s Democratic Failure, PROJECT SYNDICATE (June 24,
2016),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/brexit-democratic-failure-for-uk-bykenneth-rogoff-2016-06 (“The real lunacy of the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European
Union . . . was the absurdly low bar for exit, requiring only a simple majority.”).
5 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Inaugural Abraham Lincoln Lecture on
Constitutional Law: Electoral College Reform, Lincoln-Style, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2017)
(considering Electoral College reforms without a constitutional amendment).
6 John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions, 22 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 501, 503 (1997).
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approves a change in law that the minority opposes. If the average
member of the majority gains less than the average member of the
minority loses—if an asymmetry exists between the two sides—then
majority rule can harm society.7 The losses to the minority can
exceed the gains to the majority. For convenience, I will call this the
Asymmetry Theorem. Scholars (including those in law and
economics) understand that this theorem can justify the
entrenchment of minority rights.8 What scholars do not understand
is that the theorem can justify the entrenchment of law much more
broadly.
To see why, consider a puzzle. A central purpose of
entrenchment is to stabilize law.9 Stability, the argument goes, has
great value. But “[i]f people value legal stability, then simple
majorities should be hesitant to change laws.”10 In other words, if
we care about stability, we will oppose legal change on our own with
no need for a demanding amendment procedure. One might respond
with an argument about passions, which sometimes overtake us.
Impassioned people do not appreciate legal stability,11 but that
answer provides only a partial explanation. Countless laws about
which people are unlikely to become passionate—from speed limits
to government leases—are entrenched, if not in constitutions, then
with other mechanisms like bicameralism, presentment, and the
Senate filibuster.
Law and economics can justify the entrenchment of law on
stability grounds, even when passions run cold. The argument has
just one ingredient: transition costs.12 When laws change, people
incur transition costs—they must change their behavior, draft new
plans, update their equipment, and so on. Supporters of a change in
law, the majority, gain the difference between the policy benefit of
7 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 265 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“If a
majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”); JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, 3 THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 85–96, 163, 210–30 (Univ. of Mich. Press 1962) (analyzing
majority rule).
8 See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 32–35, 243–46 (Princeton
Univ. Press 2000) (analyzing minority rights and asymmetric intensity of preferences from a
law-and-economics perspective).
9 See infra Part II.
10 ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE LIMITS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 139
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
11 See infra Part II.
12 For a fuller discussion, see infra Section III.B.
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the change and the transition costs they pay. Opponents of the
change, the minority, lose the sum of the policy loss change brings
and the transition costs they pay. Because of this asymmetry, the
majority may gain less than the minority loses. This asymmetry
does not grow from differences in the intensity of opinion. This is
not like, say, laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, which a majority
might weakly support and a minority strongly oppose. The
asymmetry identified here emerges from something different and
ubiquitous: transition costs. Given the Asymmetry Theorem,
transition costs make majority rule inefficient—even when people
are dispassionate, and even when no intense minority is present.
These ideas provide a law and economics justification for
widespread entrenchment.
Well, almost. Law and economics uncovers the collective action
problem inherent in legal transitions, but it does not point
inevitably to entrenchment as the solution. Consider that mainstay
of legal scholarship, the Coase Theorem: given zero transaction
costs, parties will bargain to efficiency regardless of the legal rule.13
I can restate that idea as the Coase Amendment Theorem: given
zero transaction costs, parties will achieve efficiency in legal
transitions regardless of the amendment rule. According to this
theorem, the majority will only amend the law if the benefits exceed
the costs. Thus, bargaining can solve asymmetry. It can prevent the
inefficiencies that result from combining majority rule with either
transition costs or intense minorities. Later, I will provide examples
to prove this point.14
For bargaining to work its magic, transaction costs must be low.
Bargaining must be easy. In practice, transaction costs are often
high.15 The minority may be unable to strike a deal with the
majority. In that case, entrenchment offers a second-best solution.
Some simple but fundamental propositions follow. The benefit of
entrenchment grows as the transaction costs of bargaining increase.
The case for entrenchment is weak when bargaining is easy. To
solve the fundamental problems of instability and minority
13 See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1982) (“The basic idea of
the [Coase] theorem is that the structure of the law which assigns property rights and liability
does not matter so long as transaction costs are nil . . . .”). See also Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960) (“This Paper is concerned with those actions
of business firms which have harmful effects on others.”).
14 See infra Part IV.
15 See infra Part IV.
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exploitation, legal designers can entrench law—or lower the costs of
bargaining among the people law governs.
Together, transaction and transition costs justify a minimum
degree of entrenchment in law. What is the optimal degree of
entrenchment? Should the U.S. Constitution, for example, be easier
or harder to amend? The answer depends on a factor overlooked in
the literature: the nature of transition costs. Those costs can be
fixed or variable. A fixed transition cost arises in a set amount every
time law changes, whether the change is minor or major. To give a
simple example, when the sales tax increases, all cash registers
must be reprogrammed, which takes the same effort regardless of
the size of the increase. A variable cost grows with the size of
change, so major changes are costlier. As voting rights expand,
politicians make increasingly drastic changes to their platforms.
Suppose a law is outdated but modernizing it would create
transition costs. If those costs are variable—the bigger the change,
the higher the cost—then small change is better. In this case, deep
entrenchment is optimal because deep entrenchment forces law to
change in small steps.16 Later, I will explain why with rigor; here I
just illustrate with an example. Suppose the law requires people to
be at least 29 years old to run for president. Three legislators have
authority to change the law. They prefer minimum ages of 30, 40,
and 50, respectively. If the legislators make decisions using majority
law—the law is not entrenched—they may make the minimum age
40. Two of three legislators prefer 40 to 29. If the legislators require
unanimous agreement to change the minimum age—the law is
entrenched—they cannot make such a move because the first
legislator opposes it. That legislator will support an incremental
increase from 29 to 30 but not a substantial increase to 40.
Entrenchment forces law to change in small steps.
Fixed costs muddy the water. If transition costs are fixed, the
optimal change to law is large, not small. To overcome those fixed
costs, an out-of-step law must change a lot, not a little. Entrenching
law promotes small change, and un-entrenching law (i.e., making it
easy to amend, as with bare majority rule) promotes large change,
but neither approach does both. The level of entrenchment that
works well given variable costs might fail given fixed costs. I capture
these ideas with the Transitions Theorem: variable costs support
16 See Michael D. Gilbert, Entrenchment, Incrementalism, and Constitutional Collapse,
103 VA. L. REV. 631, 654–59 (2017) (studying entrenchment and the scope of legal change).
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smaller legal change and deeper entrenchment; fixed costs support
larger legal change and shallower entrenchment.
This theorem illuminates a final question, one closely tied to
entrenchment: when, if ever, should judges “update” constitutional
text? Assuming it counted as updating (people disagree), was the
Supreme Court right to find in the Constitution a right to same-sex
marriage?17 Or should the Court have waited for the democratic
process to create the right, perhaps through constitutional
amendment?18 This analysis offers fresh perspective. When
entrenchment is deep, as in the U.S. Constitution, and fixed
transition costs are high, a conundrum can arise. Only minor
amendments are possible, but only major amendments are
desirable. Entrenchment permits only minor change, but to
overcome fixed transition costs, major change is needed. Judges, but
not the democratic process, can make that major change. In this
scenario, updating is not a substitute for formal amendment.
Updating alone can achieve the desirable change.
These ideas cast doubt on work by originalists, living
constitutionalists, and others. They diminish the clash of values by
relating entrenchment to background conditions in a way that
scholars with different beliefs and ideological views can agree on.
This Article cannot resolve the entrenchment debate, but it offers a
law and economics account of it with new implications for legal
design and constitutional law.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly reviews the
debate on entrenchment. Part III analyzes minority rights,
transitions costs, and the collective action problem they have in
common. Part IV applies the Coase Theorem to entrenchment. Part
V studies the problem of optimal entrenchment and its relationship
to transition costs. Part VI applies these ideas to constitutional
updating, including through interpretation. Part VII concludes the
Article.

17 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (holding that the U.S.
Constitution grants a right to same-sex marriage).
18 See id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“By deciding this question [of same-sex
marriage] under the Constitution, the Court removes it from the realm of democratic
decision.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol54/iss1/3

8

Gilbert: The Law and Economics of Entrenchment

2019]

LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ENTRENCHMENT

69

II. THE ENTRENCHMENT DEBATE
Aristotle stated that “a readiness to change from old to new laws
enfeebles the power of the law.”19 Madison called “irregular and
mutable legislation . . . an evil in itself.”20 Locke’s Fundamental
Constitutions, written for the colony of Carolina in 1669,21 declared:
“[This] . . . shall be and remain the sacred and unalterable form and
rule of government . . . forever.”22 These enlightened thinkers
reached a common conclusion: law, and especially constitutional
law, should remain stable.
The virtues of stability are legion. It protects reliance interests23
and the “security of expectations.”24 Those expectations include the
right to property, without which “the most violent struggles”
ensue.25 It tempers “the recurrent need to establish a basic
framework for political life.”26 Stability promotes reasoned
deliberation and defuses “sudden and violent passions.”27 It permits
governments to make credible commitments to themselves, their
citizens, and other governments.28 The list goes on.
Constitutions tend to stabilize law. The linchpin, or at least a
linchpin,29 of constitutional stability is a demanding amendment
19 Aristotle, The Politics, in THE POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 11, 49
(Stephen Everson ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (350 B.C.E.).
20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 7, at 181 (James Madison).
21 See David Armitage, John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government, 32
POL. THEORY 602, 603–07 (2004) (describing Locke’s role in Carolina).
22 Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 CONST.
COMMMENT. 107, 107 (1996) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting JOHN LOCKE,
THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS OF CAROLINA § 120, microfilmed in English Books 1641–
1700, Wing Reel No. 154 (Univ. Microfilms, Inc.)).
23 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Legal Transitions: A Presumptive Vote for
the Reliance Interest, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69 (2003) (discussing the negative impact
that legal transitions have on reliance).
24 MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, COUNTING THE MANY: THE ORIGINS AND LIMITS OF
SUPERMAJORITY RULE 9 (2014) (“[I]nstitutional stability is ostensibly attractive because of
the ‘security of expectations . . . .’”).
25 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 2, at 148–49
(describing the importance of stability with respect to property rights).
26 STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 153 (1995). This point relates to coordination, which I address below.
27 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 7, at 315 (James Madison) (describing the
Senate’s role in stability).
28 See
generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 88–174 (2000).
29 Stability also depends on the heterogeneity of preferences. See Gilbert, supra note 16,
at 647–49 (developing the “heterogeneity principle”).
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rule, like the supermajority requirements in the U.S. Constitution.30
In addition to supermajority rules, law (whether constitutional or
sub-constitutional) can be entrenched through other mechanisms
like bicameralism, presentment, and the Senate filibuster.31 In
short, making law hard to change entrenches it, and entrenchment
promotes stability.
In addition to stability, entrenchment promises a second benefit:
protecting the minority from the majority. Madison developed the
argument in The Federalist Papers,32 and many scholars have
elaborated on it since.33 The logic is straightforward. In a pure
democracy—that is, a system whereby a bare majority can alter
law—the minority faces a grave risk of exploitation and harm.34
Enacting laws to protect the minority is not, by itself, sufficient
because the majority can simply repeal them.35 The protections
(often called rights) must be entrenched, as with the Thirteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.
So far, the discussion has focused on two prominent benefits of
entrenchment: stability and minority protection. Now consider the
cost. Getting law, and especially constitutional law, right presents
a challenge. Washington did not consider the Constitution “free
from imperfections,”36 and Hamilton “never expect[ed] to see a
perfect work from imperfect man.”37 The challenge compounds as
society evolves. Jerome Frank captured the idea:
The law deals with human relations in their most
complicated aspects. The whole confused, shifting
helter-skelter of life parades before it . . . . Even in a
relatively static society, men [and women] have never
See U.S. CONST. art. V (laying out amendment procedure).
See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 28, at 88–174.
32 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 7, at 265 (James Madison) (“If a majority be
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”).
33 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1522–
26 (1990) (cataloging the threats of majority rule to minorities).
34 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 7, at 265 (James Madison).
35 See, e.g., Eule, supra note 33, at 1529–30 (explaining how “filtering” majority will, as
through supermajority requirements, protects minorities).
36 See Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Imperfection and Amendability (quoting Letter of
George Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. 10, 1787), in THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 83 (Michael Kammen ed., Penguin
Books 1986)), in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 1 (Sanford Levinson ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1995).
37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 7, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton).
30
31
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been able to construct a comprehensive, eternalized set
of rules . . . . How much less is such a frozen legal system
possible in modern times.38
Jefferson argued that law must “keep pace,”39 and Frank agreed,
writing “[o]ur society would be strait-jacketed” if we were not
constantly “overhauling the law and adapting it to the realities of
ever-changing social, industrial, and political conditions.”40
Thus, a tension exists: entrenchment has value, but so does
modernization. We want law to be hard to change but not too hard.
The tension is starkest for constitutions, which must both “function
as our fundamental law” and “remain democratically responsive.”41
The tension arises with sub-constitutional laws as well.42
This tension underpins a staggering amount of scholarship.
Popular constitutionalism holds that citizens should take “active
and ongoing control over the interpretation and enforcement of
constitutional law.”43 Living constitutionalism claims that
constitutions do and should “adapt[] to new circumstances, without
being formally amended.”44 Professor Ackerman argues that the
U.S. Constitution has changed without formal amendment and that
we must respect those changes,45 while Professor Amar argues that
citizens can amend the Constitution through popular vote.46
Professor Levinson wants to fix “the many structural provisions of
the Constitution that place almost insurmountable barriers in the
way of any acceptable notion of democracy.”47 Professor Bickel and
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 6 (1931).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 15 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 32, 41 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
40 FRANK, supra note 38, at 6–7.
41 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION
IN 2020, at 28 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
42 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A
Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 passim (2002) (analyzing the entrenchment of statutes).
43 Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 959
(2004).
44 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1 (2010); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM 3 (2011) (promoting interpretation that is “both originalist and living
constitutionalist”).
45 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 23–33 (1991).
46 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 457 (1994) (“We the People of the United States have a legal
right to alter our Government—to change our Constitution—via a majoritarian and populist
mechanism akin to a national referendum . . . .”).
47 SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
38
39
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many others worry about judges’ countermajoritarian decisions.48
The common concern in this work is law’s democratic
responsiveness.
On the other side, jurists have spent decades developing the
influential theory of originalism, which holds that the meaning of
the U.S. Constitution was fixed at the time of adoption.49 Prominent
writers in this vein include Judge Bork,50 Justices Rehnquist and
Scalia,51 and many distinguished scholars.52 Many of these writers
oppose judicial activism, support demanding amendment processes,
and object to circumvention of Article V.53 Much of this work
celebrates stability.54
As this brief tour shows, many enduring debates relate to
entrenchment.55 Given this, one might suppose that amendment
rules, which directly affect law’s entrenchment, have attracted
scholars’ attention. This is partially correct. Social scientists have
provided theories and evidence on how amendment rules operate.56
See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH passim (1962).
For a definition of originalism, discussion of its history, and citations to classic works,
see generally Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599
(2004).
50 E.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 3 (1971) (arguing that “certain enduring principles” contained in the Constitution are
“placed beyond the reach of majorities”).
51 See generally William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 693 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
52 See generally SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning
of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001); John Harrison, Reconstructing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1398–401 (1992); Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995); Caleb
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003); John C. Yoo,
The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84
CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996).
53 See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL D. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 37 (2013) (discussing the benefits of a supermajority amendment rule).
54 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 51, at 862 (defending originalism and stating, “[t]he purpose
of constitutional guarantees—and in particular those constitutional guarantees of individual
rights that are at the center of this controversy—is precisely to prevent the law from reflecting
certain changes in original values that the society adopting the Constitution thinks
fundamentally undesirable” (emphasis omitted)).
55 See infra Part III.
56 See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 85–96, 211–31 (presenting a germinal
analysis of qualified majority rules); see also generally Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional
Rights, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1991) (studying voting thresholds and transaction costs);
Yves Balasko & Hervé Crès, The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules,
75 J. ECON. THEORY 237 (1997) (studying voting thresholds and Condorcet cycling); Ruth C.
Ben-Yashar & Shmuel I. Nitzan, The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed–Size Committees in
48
49
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But on the normative question that preoccupies legal scholars—
what is the optimal level of entrenchment given the value of
stability?—research is thin. Even Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport, who spent a decade on the question, remain uncertain.
They report that achieving certain constitutional goals “ordinarily
requires a supermajority rule [for amendment] in the range of at
least two-thirds or three-quarters.”57
In addition to the sheer complexity of the problem, one tendency
stifles headway: “value creep.” Before the ink dries on the core
debate, scholars tend to introduce new complications, like the
importance of consensus,58 veils of ignorance,59 politicization,60 the
link between amendment and judicial legitimacy,61 and so forth.
These ideas may matter, but they rest on an unstable foundation.
This Article returns to the central, fundamental choice between
entrenchment and modernization in law. The analysis focuses on
constitutions (the locus of the entrenchment debate), but it applies
to statutes, treaties, and other forms of law as well.62
Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result, 38 INT’L ECON. Rev. 175 (1997) (studying
voting thresholds and decision-making skill); Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden,
Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem (studying voting thresholds,
legislative size, and the rate of constitutional amendment), in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN 195 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2011); Mark Fey, A Note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with
Supermajority Voting Rules, 20 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 27 (2003) (studying voting
thresholds and supermajority voting rules); Brett Graham & Dan Bernhardt, Flexibility vs.
Protection from an Unrepresentative Legislative Majority, 93 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 59
(2015) (studying voting thresholds and misrepresentation as a result of an unchecked
legislature); Richard Holden, Supermajority Voting Rules (July 31, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author) (studying the relationship between voting thresholds
and the size of decision-making bodies); Dennis C. Mueller, The Importance of Uncertainty in
a Two-Stage Theory of Constitutions, 108 PUB. CHOICE 223 (2001) (studying voting thresholds
and uncertainty in collective decision making).
57 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 53, at 37.
58 See id. at 38–39 (stressing the importance of consensus as a distinct consequentialist
and constitutional value).
59 See id. at 42–43 (arguing that entrenchment creates a veil of ignorance that generates
entrenchments with good consequences).
60 Kathleen
Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, AM. PROSPECT (1995),
https://prospect.org/article/constitutional-amendmentitis (opposing amendments because
they “trivialize or politicize the Constitution”).
61 Compare id. (explaining that “[i]ncreasing the frequency of constitutional amendment
would undermine the respect and legitimacy the Court now enjoys”), with Adrian Vermeule,
Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law (criticizing the argument
that constitutional amendments undermine the Supreme Court’s legitimacy), in THE LEAST
EXAMINED BRANCH 229, 242–56 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
62 This Article is mostly an exercise in ideal theory, not historical explanation. It analyzes
how entrenchment works, not how particular entrenched laws like the U.S. Constitution
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III. THE ECONOMICS OF INSTABILITY
This Part considers the problems that entrenchment aims to
solve—instability and minority interests—from an economic point
of view. Translating the concern over minority rights is
straightforward; economic intuitions match common sense. But
translating the concern over stability is harder. After explaining
why, I offer a new account of instability—one rooted in transition
costs instead of passions. This account does a better job of
explaining and justifying the widespread entrenchment we observe
in practice, including in areas bereft of intense minorities and
passionate majorities.
A. MINORITIES AND THE ASYMMETRY THEOREM

A core justification for entrenchment, especially in constitutional
law, is to protect minorities from the majority.63 The intuition is
simple; if a bare majority can make and change law, then the
majority can cause grave harm to the minority. Entrenchment, and
especially entrenched rights, can prevent this.64 The rights protect
the minority, and entrenching the rights makes it harder for the
majority to take them away.65
These ideas can be reframed in economic terms. Imagine seven
voters. Four of them, the majority, support a change in law. The
change would give each of them a benefit (psychological, financial,
or whatever) of +1 for a total gain of +4. The other three voters, a
came to be. The analysis focuses on formal entrenchment, not informal or “functional”
entrenchment. See generally Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment
and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400 (2015).
63 See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162,
1164 (1977) (“The concern that democratic government will provide inadequate protection for
minorities is as old as the nation—perhaps as old as the idea of democracy itself.”). Sometimes
we might have the opposite worry. An organized minority might exploit a disorganized
majority. See, e.g., COOTER, supra note 8, at 66–73 (explaining the connection between group
size, free riding, and representation). That is a serious concern, but entrenchment is not
usually assumed to help with it, so I do not address it.
64 See generally N.W. Barber, Why Entrench?, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 325, 325 (2016)
(presenting stability and minority interests as arguments for entrenchment).
65 Cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities . . . . One’s right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.”).
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minority, oppose the change in law. The change would impose a cost
on each of them of –3 for a total loss of –9. In this situation,
economists (and many others) would oppose making the change.
Yes, the majority gains, but the minority suffers even more, so the
overall effect is negative.
The root problem is an asymmetry in the voters’ preferences. The
minority cares more than the majority. If they cared the same—if
their preferences were not intense—the problem would disappear.
The proposed change would benefit members of the majority +1
apiece, and it would cost members of the minority –1 apiece. The net
effect would be positive (+1). The asymmetry makes it negative. For
convenience, I capture this idea with the Asymmetry Theorem: if
the majority gains less from a change in law than the minority loses,
majority rule is inefficient.
To prevent the inefficiency of majority rule, we can entrench the
law, perhaps with a supermajority rule. Return to the example
above with intense preferences: four voters would gain +1 apiece
from a change in law, and three voters would lose –3 apiece. Under
bare majority rule, the change will happen, but under a five-vote
supermajority rule it will not. This is efficient. Instead of the
majority gaining +4 and the minority losing –9 (net of –5), the
proposal will fail, and the majority and minority will each get zero
(net of 0). Getting nothing is more efficient than losing 5.
B. STABILITY AND TRANSITION COSTS

Translating the concern of minority rights into economics is easy
but translating the concern over instability is harder. Before
explaining why, it will help to review and reframe some ideas
around instability using language from economics.
“Stability in government,” Madison wrote, “is essential to
national character and to . . . that repose and confidence in the
minds of the people.”66 If stability has benefits, then instability has
costs. Here is a brief description of some of those costs. New laws
must be researched, which often requires experts to testify,
lobbyists to cajole, and legislators to listen. They must be drafted,
reviewed, amended, and voted on, which requires time and
resources from legislators and their staffs. New laws must be
implemented, which requires training for enforcement agents,
66

THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 7, at 181 (James Madison).
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adapting by lawyers and regulated parties, and adjudicating in
court. To demonstrate, consider the Affordable Care Act.67 Passage
of that law remade the market for health insurance, causing states,
insurers, and millions of consumers to change their behavior.68 It
also triggered rule-making by bureaucrats,69 disputes in state and
federal court,70 and at least one statewide ballot initiative.71
Changing law comes with other costs that lawyers fear—so much
that they feature in every law student’s education. Changing law
can squander reliance.72 A whiskey distillery built today becomes
inoperable when a constitutional prohibition on alcohol gets enacted
tomorrow. Farmers must change their facilities and practices,
possibly in drastic ways, when citizens approve new laws on the
treatment of chickens and pigs.73
Looking ahead, shifts in law may undermine predictability.74
However stable parties thought law was before, they may think it
less stable after a change. That undermines their ability to plan—
or more precisely, causes them to incur extra costs to address
uncertainty while planning.75 Current events exemplify this idea.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012).
See generally David Blumenthal, Melinda Abrams & Rachel Nuzum, The Affordable
Care Act at 5 Years, 372 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2451 (2015) (examining the effects the Affordable
Care Act has had since its enactment 5 years prior).
69 See generally Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the
Affordable Care Act: Law and Process, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 441 (2014) (describing
agency rulemaking and other actions under the Affordable Care Act).
70 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (upholding the
individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act).
71 See Michael D. Gilbert, Interpreting Initiatives, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1621, 1621–22 (2013)
(describing Issue 3—a ballot initiative to undercut part of the Affordable Care Act).
72 See generally Epstein, supra note 23 (examining the negative consequence legal
transitions can have on the reliance interest).
73 For a general statement of the point, see Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 518 (1986) (“The crucial yet simple conclusion is that
changes in government policy—or, more generally, changes in the prospects for reforms—will
affect the value of investments made prior to those changes to the extent that such changes
were not fully anticipated.”). For examples of legal changes that might have this effect, see
id. at 517, which lists instances of unexpected legal changes affecting the value of
investments.
74 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue (“[T]he law should be such that
people will be able to be guided by it.”), in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 212, 213 (Joseph Raz ed.,
1979); Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (equating “constancy and predictability in the law” with “rule-of-law
ideas”).
75 See Kaplow, supra note 73, at 517 (“Moreover, not only do reforms themselves trigger
changes in value, but significant changes in the likelihood of reforms do so as well.” (citing
67
68
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Following British citizens’ surprise vote to exit the European Union,
employers, investors, and many others in the United Kingdom and
throughout Europe have spent time and money planning for
uncertainty in a way they previously did not.76
As this discussion shows, the costs of instability come in many
forms. To simplify, I refer to all costs of legal change as “transition
costs.”77 Transition costs capture everything jurists worry about
when defending stability and opposing legal change.78
C. THE PUZZLE OF INSTABILITY

Without entrenchment, fickle majorities will change law on a
whim, satisfying themselves but imposing great harm on society
through destabilization.79 In the language above, they will approve
legal change even when the transition costs are so high that they

Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 587 (1984))).
76 See Steven Erlanger, Britain Votes to Leave E.U.; Cameron Plans to Step Down, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexiteuropean-union-referendum.html?partner=bloomberg (describing the vote as a “stunning
turn of events . . . accompanied by a plunge in the financial markets” and carrying “profound
implications for Britain’s legal system . . . and for Britain’s economy”).
77 The term is not original. See, e.g., John Quinn & Michael J. Trebilcock, Compensation,
Transition Costs, and Regulatory Change, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 117 (1982) (discussing
transaction costs and the classes of them); see also Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal
Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 789 (2002) (cataloging transition costs).
78 Should people receive compensation when a legal change forces them to incur transition
costs? Professor Kaplow argues no because compensation would discourage people from
anticipating changes in law. See Kaplow, supra note 73, at 519 (arguing against compensation
for legal changes). Kaplow’s article, which builds on Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions:
The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977), sparked
literature on transition policy. See Kaplow, supra note 73, at 519 (discussing Graetz’s
theories). That literature studies how to minimize transition costs by improving incentives.
See, e.g., William B. Tye & Frank C. Graves, The Economics of Negative Barriers to Entry:
How to Recover Stranded Costs and Achieve Competition on Equal Terms in the Electric
Utility Industry, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 175, 176 (1997) (arguing that “[a]llowing incumbents
a fair opportunity for recovery of stranded costs . . . during a transition to deregulation is not
an impediment to competition on equal terms”). For purposes of this Article, it does not
matter whether transition costs are minimized, just that they exist. I am unaware of any
paper relating transition costs to entrenchment.
79 See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 28, at 119–22 (discussing Athenian fears of majorities
acting on passion); HOLMES, supra note 26, at 134–35 (discussing the need to “tie the
community’s hands”).
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swamp any benefit.80 To prevent this calamity, entrench law.81 Then
majorities, or at least bare majorities, will be constrained, law will
remain stable, and society will not incur transition costs.82
This logic (if not this exact language) provides a standard
justification for entrenchment.83 Scholars have recited it since the
Founding.84 Today, it qualifies as conventional wisdom, even a
truism. But the whole argument begs a question. Society qua society
does not incur transition costs. Individuals incur transition costs.
And if individuals incur transition costs, they should hesitate to
change laws when transition costs—which they pay—are high.
Professor Przeworski captured this point: “If people value legal
stability, then simple majorities should be hesitant to change
laws . . . . [S]imple-majority rule is sufficient to prevent capricious
legal changes.”85
A defender of the truism might respond as follows. Rational
people will not change law—and incur high transition costs—on a
whim, but passionate people will.86 In lawmaking, and especially in
constitutional lawmaking, people get passionate.87 In the heat of the
moment, they not only mistake bad policies for good ones, they
forget or ignore transition costs.88 Entrenchment protects against
such short-sighted behavior.89
The danger of passion is well known and widely accepted.90 But
passion only partly solves the puzzle. One can imagine lawmakers
and citizens getting passionate about security, taxes, immigration,
religion, abortion, and so on. Entrenching law on those matters
might make sense. But governments entrench so much more. Every
federal statute is sheltered by bicameralism and presentment,91
80 See ELSTER, supra note 28, at 119–22 (discussing the issues of majority passions);
HOLMES, supra note 26, at 135 (discussing how majorities would “inevitably shipwreck
themselves”).
81 See ELSTER, supra note 28, at 117–18 (discussing the need for precommitment);
HOLMES, supra note 26, at 135 (discussing the Constitution’s remedy of removing “certain
decisions from the democratic process”).
82 See HOLMES, supra note 26, at 134–77.
83 See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 28, at 117–22; HOLMES, supra note 26, at 134–77.
84 See supra notes 20, 25, and 27 and accompanying text.
85 PRZEWORSKI, supra note 10, at 139.
86 See supra Part II.
87 See supra Part II.
88 See supra Part II.
89 See supra Part II.
90 See ELSTER, supra note 28, at 119–23.
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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both standard mechanisms of entrenchment.92 Yet many of these
statutes—I suspect a substantial majority—will rarely, if ever,
engender passion. Consider, for example, the federal statute
addressing leases for government hospitals.93 Next to the freedoms
of speech and religion, the U.S. Constitution addresses mundane
topics like postal roads.94 In Alabama, the state constitution
addresses traffic,95 bingo,96 and shrimp sales.97
Again, defenders of the truism might offer a response. They
might say that the justification for entrenching these kinds of
provisions lies elsewhere.98 By making law hard to change,
entrenchment promotes deliberation, a virtue distinct from
stability.99 They might say entrenchment supplies individuals with
a focal point to coordinate their behavior.100 These arguments might
well have merit, but they chip away at the truism until we are left
with a mismatch. To many jurists, the primary justification for
entrenchment is stability,101 yet stability alone cannot explain much
of the entrenchment we observe in practice.102
D. TRANSITION COSTS AND THE ASYMMETRY THEOREM

In fact, the stability argument is strong—stronger than scholars
realize—and a main contribution of this Article is to explain why.
Recall that society qua society does not incur transition costs,
individuals do.103 Even if individuals incur transition costs, and
even if they account for those costs when making decisions (i.e., even
92 See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 28, at 133–40 (discussing bicameralism and presentment
as methods of entrenchment).
93 See 38 U.S.C. § 8103 (“The Secretary [of Veterans’ Affairs] may enter into a lease for
the use of any facility described in paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection for not more than 35
years . . . .”).
94 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
95 See ALA. CONST. amend. 756.
96 See ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744.
97 See ALA. CONST. amend. 766.
98 See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82–140
(1990); HOLMES, supra note 26, at 169–72.
99 See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 26, at 169–72 (relating constitutionalism to public debate).
100 See HARDIN, supra note 98, at 82–140 (conceptualizing constitutions as coordination
devices).
101 See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 28, at 155 (“The stabilizing effect of requiring
supermajorities for amending the constitution is arguably the most important aspect of
constitutional precommitment.”).
102 See supra Part I.
103 See supra Section III.C.
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if they are not impassioned), they may still approve changes to law
that harm society. This is easy to see in the extreme case. Suppose
the majority supports a change in law and the minority opposes it.
Suppose further that the majority can force the minority to bear all
of the transition costs. The minority faces a double loss: they suffer
from the substance of the change in law, and they suffer from all the
transition costs the change requires. That double loss might
outweigh the benefit to the majority. But members of the majority
will support the change anyway because they only see benefits, not
costs.104
This is an extreme and unlikely case, but the logic holds in more
plausible circumstances as well. Consider another example. Four
out of seven voters, a majority, support a change in law. For them,
the change would provide a benefit of +1 apiece. The other three
voters oppose the change in law, as it would come with a cost of –1
apiece. These costs and benefits flow from the substance of the new
law itself—some people like it, other do not. Separate from the
substance, the change in law would also produce a transition cost.
This time the majority cannot stick the minority with that cost; the
voters bear it pro rata. The cost is 0.25 apiece. The majority will still
support the change, as it delivers a net benefit of 0.75 apiece. If law
is not entrenched, the majority will enact the change. But this will
harm society. The gains to the majority total +3 (0.75 x 4), while the
losses to the minority total –3.75 (–1.25 x 3).105
The root problem is transition costs. They create an asymmetry
between the winners and losers following a change in law. The
people who support a new law, a majority, gain the difference
between their benefit from the new law and the transition cost they
pay. The people who oppose the change, a minority, suffer the sum
of their loss from the new law and the transition cost they pay. Each
loser loses more than each winner wins. When this is true, the
Asymmetry Theorem kicks in. Majority rule may do more harm
than good.
Scholars have long recognized this kind of problem. In The
Calculus of Consent, Professors James Buchanan and Gordon

104 This resembles an example in BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 164–67. My
argument extends Buchanan and Tullock’s conclusion.
105 I assume that the majority does not compensate the minority for its losses. This
assumption often holds in practice and matches Kaplow’s prescription. See Kaplow, supra
note 73, at 542 (explaining that non-compensation improves the injured parties’ incentives).
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Tullock provided a path-breaking analysis of majority rule.106 They
showed that the coercion inherent in majority rule—the minority
must abide by the majority’s decision—can lead to social harm.107
Take one of Buchanan and Tullock’s examples: three voters decide
on a bill that would tax each of them $0.33 and build roads that
provide a benefit of $0.42 to the first voter, $0.42 to the second voter,
and no benefit to the third voter.108 Total costs equal $0.99, and total
benefits equal $0.84 for a net loss of –$0.15, so the bill is
inefficient.109 Under majority rule, the bill nevertheless passes, as
the first and second voters each gain $0.09.110
Whereas Buchanan and Tullock focused on taxes, legal scholars
focus more abstractly on the intensity of preferences.111 As
explained above, if members of the minority—racial, religious, or
otherwise—feel more strongly than others, then majority rule can
be inefficient.112 Though few in number, minorities may suffer large
losses from changes in law while the majority makes only modest
gains.113 Consider prohibitions on same-sex marriage. They may
have provided a small benefit to members of the majority, but they
imposed a greater harm on an oppressed minority.
My argument is in the same spirit. Like the earlier work, I argue
that majority rule can make society worse off. The difference lies in
the mechanism: transition costs. This mechanism does not involve
taxes or other extractions whereby the majority redistributes from
the minority, as in The Calculus of Consent.114 Transition costs do
not build roads; they are a social loss. Nor do transition costs involve
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 160–69.
Id.
108 Id. at 161–62.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Buchanan and Tullock appreciate that different intensities of preference can affect the
desirability of majority rule. See id. at 163 (introducing asymmetry to the equation depending
on the “imputed values” of an individual’s opinion on the public work project).
112 Though not expressed in the language of efficiency, this idea appears in the literature.
See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54
WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1978) (discussing how elected officials are responsive to “minority
pressures” and thus “may vote for . . . a civil rights or social reform bill with full knowledge
that a majority of their constituents oppose the measure”); Eule, supra note 33, at 1556
(arguing the political system structure requires legislators to “bring[] minorities into the
process”). Traces of the idea appear in classic works. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra
note 7, at 264–67 (James Madison) (“[T]he private interest of every individual may be sentinel
over the public rights.”).
113 See supra Section III.A.
114 See supra Section III.C.
106
107
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minorities with intense preferences. I assume everyone has equally
intense preferences (in the seven-voter example,115 each voter
gained or lost 1). Under this assumption, when changing law
provides a policy benefit to the majority and a policy loss to the
minority, and when everyone pays transition costs, each loser loses
more than each winner wins. That point is essential to the
conclusion that majority rule can harm society.
This mechanism is different and ubiquitous. Some changes to law
assess new taxes or redistribute from the minority to the majority,
as in Buchanan and Tullock’s example,116 but others do not. On
some issues, the minority has more intense preferences than the
majority.117 Sometimes intense minorities occupy both sides of an
issue and cancel each other out—advocates and opponents of
abortion rights might fit this scenario. For these reasons, the
asymmetry that scholars usually worry about may be uncommon.
In contrast, the asymmetry identified here must arise constantly:
there are always transition costs. This makes majority rule
problematic in a larger set of circumstances than we appreciate.
Even when voters rationally account for transition costs, and even
with no intense minority present, voters may still approve
net-negative changes to law.
This idea helps explain and justify the widespread use of
entrenchment. It does so by showing that instability does not
require irrationality.118 It also shows that concerns with instability
and minority rights grow from a common source: collective action
problems.119 Decisions that are individually rational for members of
the majority are destructive for the whole society. The analysis
resuscitates and strengthens the truism.120 The stability
See supra p. 80.
See supra p. 81.
117 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
118 See supra Section III.B.
119 See supra Section III.A.
120 It also casts a shadow on an institution deeply embedded in the United States: direct
democracy. Twenty-four states and more than half of American cities permit citizens to make
law directly using ballot initiatives. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct
Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 695 (2010). The usual
requirement for passage of a statutory initiative is simple majority support. See
State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum Provisions, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST.,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states.cfm (last visited Nov. 23, 2019) (displaying a
state-by-state grid of initiative and referendum provisions)Error! Hyperlink reference not
valid.. In California, for example, a majority of citizens can use initiatives to amend the state
constitution. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 10. Because of transition costs, initiatives can cause
115
116
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justification for entrenchment is strong even when passions are in
check.
IV. ENTRENCHMENT: A COASEAN APPROACH
The last Part analyzed and united two fundamental challenges
to majority rule: minority interests and instability.121 These
challenges remain as serious under a law and economics framework
as under conventional thinking. In fact, law and economics make
the concern over instability even more pressing. Here, I reconsider
the solution. Entrenchment can mitigate the two challenges, but so
can something else: bargaining. As I will explain, when bargaining
succeeds, entrenchment is unnecessary.122 My objective is not to
critique entrenchment but to draw out its deepest justification.
A. THE COASE THEOREM IN BRIEF

The Coase Theorem sits at the heart of law and economics. The
theorem has animated generations of scholarship on property,
contracts, and torts.123 More recently, scholars have applied it to
public law topics like federalism.124 I apply it to entrenchment.
The theorem can be stated succinctly: if the transaction costs of
bargaining are zero, parties will achieve efficiency on their own,
regardless of the legal rule.125 Consider an example.126 If a nightclub
plays music after midnight, it will earn $500, but the neighbor will
social harm, even when intense minorities are not present. This is especially likely when
initiatives pass by a narrow margin.
121 See supra Part III.
122 See infra Section IV.B.
123 For a work that connects the Coase Theorem to all of these fields, see ROBERT COOTER
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2012).
124 See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 139 (2010) (“The Federal Coase Theorem
describes a condition—zero transaction costs—under which the allocation of powers to
different levels of government makes no difference to the efficient supply of public goods.”).
125 See Coase, supra note 13, at 10 (“With costless market transactions, the decision of the
courts concerning liability for damage would be without effect on the allocation of resources.”).
Coase did not actually use the phrase “transaction costs,” but many others have. See, e.g.,
Cooter, supra note 13, at 14 (“The basic idea of the [Coase] theorem is that the structure of
the law which assigns property rights and liability does not matter so long as transaction
costs are nil . . . .”).
126 This example is developed in Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, Constitutional Law
and Economics, in RESEARCH METHODS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK (Malcolm
Langford & David S. Law eds., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 12–13), Error! Hyperlink
reference not valid.https://ssrn.com/abstract=3123253.
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suffer a loss from noise of $100.127 Thus, operating produces net
value of $400, whereas not operating produces net value of $0.128
Operating is the efficient choice.129 If the legal rule is “club’s right,”
the nightclub will operate.130
Reconsider the scenario with a different legal rule, “neighbor’s
right.”131 The club cannot operate after midnight unless the
neighbor waives her right to quiet.132 One might suppose that the
neighbor will not waive her right, so the club will not operate. But
this is not necessarily true. The nightclub could pay the neighbor
$300 in exchange for permission to play music. The neighbor would
make $200 ($300 in cash minus $100 in harm from noise) instead of
nothing, and the nightclub would make $200 ($500 in earnings
minus $300 paid to the neighbor) instead of nothing. Both parties
prefer this arrangement.133 Even if the law is “neighbor’s right,” the
club will play music.134
For the club and the neighbor to strike this deal, they must be
able to bargain with one another.135 This might be easy; the club’s
owner and the neighbor could be sisters on good terms. Or
bargaining might be hard. Perhaps the owner and the neighbor
speak different languages or are engaged in a bitter divorce.136
When bargaining is hard—in the lingo, when the transaction
costs of bargaining are high—the legal rule determines efficiency.137
If the rule is “club’s right,” the club will operate, and efficiency will
result. If the rule is “neighbor’s right,” the club will not operate, and
inefficiency will result. When bargaining is easy—transaction costs
are zero—the legal rule is irrelevant to efficiency.138 Whether the
rule is “club’s right” or “neighbor’s right,” easy bargaining means

Id. at 12.
Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 12–13.
134 Id. at 13.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 12–13.
137 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 13, at 18–20, 28 (explaining that when people cannot
cooperate “legal rights should be structured to eliminate the most destructive noncooperative
outcomes”—in other words, structure law to prevent inefficiency).
138 See Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 126, at 13 (explaining when bargaining costs are low,
the efficient outcome will prevail regardless of the legal rule).
127
128
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the club will operate, as in the example above.139 In both cases, the
total value of $400 will be realized.140
The Coase Theorem makes predictions about when law matters
for efficiency and when it does not.141 It also leads to prescriptions.
Suppose efficiency is the state’s objective. Given this and the facts
above, the state wants the nightclub to operate. How can the state
achieve this? One option is that the state can make the legal rule
“club’s right.” Then the club will definitely operate, and it does not
matter if bargaining is easy or hard. Here, the state imposes the
efficient solution. Alternatively, the state can lower the transaction
costs of bargaining. For example, it can make contracts between
nightclubs and neighbors easier to sign and enforce. Then, the club
will definitely operate. It does not matter if the rule is “club’s right”
or “neighbor’s right;” the parties will agree to bargain around the
law if it gets in the way of their profits. Here the state facilitates the
efficient solution.142
Should the state impose or facilitate? The answer depends on
many factors, and this Article will not explore it beyond the
following observation. Imposing solutions can lead to errors when
facts are heterogeneous. To explain, suppose the state makes the
rule “club’s right.” Then, nightclubs will operate. This promotes
efficiency in the case above, but it might undermine efficiency down
the block where another nightclub operates and where the gains
from its music are outweighed by the losses to the neighbor. If the
state could facilitate, this error would evaporate. In the first case,
the parties would bargain as needed and the club would operate. In
the second case, the parties would bargain as needed and the club
would not operate. Costless bargaining implies efficiency in every
individual case.
B. THE COASE AMENDMENT THEOREM

Usually scholars apply the Coase Theorem to problems in private
law, like the nuisance in the music example.143 The logic of the

139
140
141
142
143

Id.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
For a discussion of imposing versus facilitating, see id. at 14–15.
See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 123 (applying Coase Theorem to private law).
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theorem, however, applies across the board from mundane disputes
among neighbors to grand dilemmas in public law.144
Consider again the problem of intense minorities.145 We have
seven voters. Four of them support a proposed change in law, and
the change would give each of them a benefit of +1. The other three
voters oppose the proposal, as it would impose a cost on each of them
of –3. Changing the law would be inefficient. Is it possible to prevent
the change and achieve efficiency?
The Coase Theorem gives us two choices: impose or facilitate. The
state (probably through the Constitution) could impose by requiring
a supermajority to change the law. Instead of a bare majority of four
votes, it takes a supermajority of five. This blocks the proposal.
Instead of the inefficient outcome (proposal passes, net of –5), we
get the efficient outcome (proposal fails, net of 0).
Instead of imposing with a supermajority rule, the state could
facilitate. It could retain a bare majority rule and encourage the
parties to bargain. The minority could make the following offer to
the majority: vote against the proposal, and we will pay each of you
+1.5 (this could be money from the minorities’ pockets, political
favors, etc.). Instead of enacting the proposal and getting +1 apiece,
members of the majority can vote down the proposal and get +1.5
apiece. They prefer the bargain. The minority does too. Instead of
being stuck with the new law and collectively losing –9, they can
prevent the proposal with the bargain and collectively lose –6 (–1.5
x 4). The collective losses to the minority (–6) exactly equal the
collective gains to the majority (+6). Thus, we achieve efficiency.
Instead of the proposal passing (net of –5), the proposal fails (net
of 0).
Bargaining can prevent the inefficiency associated with intense
minorities and majority rule.146 In fact, bargaining works better
144 See Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 126, at 13 (articulating the “Public Coase Theorem”);
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 124, at 139 (developing the “Federal Coase Theorem”). In a
valuable article, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport recognize the relevance of the Coase
Theorem to amendment rules. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and
Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2007) (“In the
absence of transaction costs, it also does not matter from an efficiency perspective what
proportion of the legislature is required to enact a law.”). This Article develops and extends
the idea.
145 See supra Section III.A.
146 Bargaining cannot, however, prevent redistribution. In the example, the total payoff to
the group is 0 under supermajority rule and 0 under bargaining. But supermajority rule gives
the minority a payoff of 0, while bargaining gives the minority a payoff of –6 (and the majority
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than the alternative, the supermajority rule. Like “club’s right,” the
supermajority rule makes mistakes when facts are heterogeneous.
In the example above, the supermajority rule prevents the
inefficient law from passing. But one can reach a different result by
changing the facts. Suppose the four voters in the majority would
gain +3 apiece from the change in law, while the three voters in the
minority would lose –1 apiece. Now efficiency requires the law to
pass, but the supermajority rule might prevent the law from
passing. Bargaining does not create this problem. If the parties can
bargain, they will always get it right.
Bargaining can solve the problem of transition costs too. Recall
the example.147 Four voters support a change in law that would
provide a policy benefit of +1 apiece. Three voters oppose the change
in law, as it would come with a policy cost of –1 apiece. If the law
changes, every voter bears a transition cost of –0.25 apiece. Thus,
four voters would each gain +0.75 (net benefit of 3), and three voters
would each lose –1.25 (net cost of –3.75), from changing the law. We
could prevent the inefficient change with a supermajority rule. Only
a bare majority, four of seven, would vote for the new law.
Alternatively, we could prevent the change with a bargain. The
minority could make the following offer to the majority: vote against
the proposal, and we will pay each of you +0.8. Members of the
majority prefer +0.8 to +0.75, so they prefer the bargain. Members
of the minority would rather make the payments and lose –3.2 (–0.8
x 4) collectively than have the law enacted and lose –3.75
collectively. The total losses to the minority (–3.2) exactly equal the
total gains to the majority (+3.2). Thus, we achieve efficiency.
Instead of the proposal passing (net of –0.75), the proposal fails (net
of 0).
Again, bargaining works better than the supermajority rule. The
supermajority rule can make mistakes. If the transition cost is
sufficiently low—say, 0.1 apiece in the example above—the change
is efficient, but the supermajority rule might prevent it. Bargaining
will not. If the parties can bargain, they will always get it right.
To summarize, given intense minorities or, more commonly,
transition costs, majority rule can lead to inefficient changes in law.
To prevent those inefficient changes, the state can impose a solution
an offsetting payoff of +6). Distribution is important in general but irrelevant to the argument
here, which is that bargaining can prevent inefficiency under majority rule.
147 See supra Section III.D.
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by entrenching the law, as with a supermajority rule. Alternatively,
the state can facilitate a solution by encouraging the parties to
bargain. If the parties can bargain, they will always achieve
efficiency on their own. To state the point more fully, consider the
Coase Amendment Theorem: given zero transaction costs, parties
will achieve efficiency in legal transitions regardless of the
amendment rule.148 Whether changing law requires a bare majority
or a supermajority, whether the relevant legislature is unicameral
or bicameral, whether the executive has a veto or not, the parties
will bargain to efficiency if transaction costs are low.
C. TRANSACTION COSTS AND ENTRENCHMENT

If bargaining can solve the inefficiency of majority rule, and solve
it better than entrenchment, why do we observe so much
entrenchment? For bargaining to succeed, transaction costs must be
zero, or at least low. Sometimes, transaction costs might in fact be
low. But often they will be high.149 The seven people in the examples
above might find negotiating with one another difficult:150 they
might dislike each other or they might doubt one another’s
trustworthiness.151
Now, move from the simple example to reality. A million-person
minority cannot bargain with a ten-million-person majority. No
conference room can hold them. Most of those people must be
strangers to one another, and bargaining among strangers is
usually harder than bargaining among friends. Unlike the club
owner and the neighbor, millions of people cannot sign a contract
enforceable in court. Who would draft it? Who would litigate it when
conflicts arise? Who would collect from the minority to pay off the
majority? The trust problems multiply.
Now we have a fuller account of the inefficiency of majority rule.
The problem is not asymmetry—winners win less than losers lose—
by itself. The problem is asymmetry coupled with high transaction
costs.
See supra Section III.B.
See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 144, at 1124 (“Our political world . . . is plagued
by transaction costs.”).
150 See supra Sections III.A, III.D.
151 See generally Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict,
Commitment, and Politics, 31 J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 620, 642 (2003) (analyzing the inability
to make credible political commitments and the implications for bargaining).
148
149
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As with the nightclub and the neighbor example,152 the state can
promote efficiency by imposing a solution or facilitating a bargain.
Facilitating means lowering transaction costs. A great deal of public
law can be conceptualized as lowering transaction costs. Creating a
legislature, electing people to it, ensuring minorities have a seat at
the table—these efforts and many others lower the costs of
bargaining among society’s groups. Sometimes, those efforts might
be enough but not always. We can lower transaction costs but not
always enough to ensure efficiency. Thus, we supplement
facilitation with imposition. Imposition in this context means
entrenchment. Entrench the law so a bare majority cannot change
it. Unlike bargaining, entrenchment cannot get every case right.
Sometimes, it will prevent efficient change.153 But if bargaining is
impossible, entrenchment is the next-best option.
These ideas lead to some simple, but important, propositions.
The case for entrenchment grows as transaction costs increase. The
case for entrenchment is weak when bargaining is easy. This may
explain why entrenchment is perhaps more common in national
law, which involves many people, than local law, which involves
relatively few. To solve the problems of instability and minority
exploitation, entrench law—or, if possible, lower the costs of
bargaining among the people law governs.
V. ON OPTIMAL ENTRENCHMENT
The central points above can be summarized in short order. If
changing law comes with transition costs, as it usually does, then
bare majority rule can lead to inefficient lawmaking. This is true
even when voters are rational (i.e., not impassioned) and no intense
minority is present. If the transaction costs of bargaining are high,
as they often are, then parties cannot bargain to efficiency. They
will simply vote. Entrenchment can mitigate the problem by making
law harder to change and thus resistant to inefficient transitions.
These ideas justify a minimum level of entrenchment for many
laws, including laws unlikely to provoke passions. But what is the
optimal level of entrenchment? What is the solution to Jefferson and

See supra Section IV.A.
Likewise, it will sometimes fail to prevent inefficient change, as when the supermajority
benefits from a new law, but the small minority suffers even more.
152
153

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

29

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 3

90

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:61

Madison’s dilemma?154 The answer depends on something scholars
have overlooked: the nature of transition costs.
A. THE MODERNIZATION PRINCIPLE

Before discussing transition costs, I address benefits (and
benefits only—assume for now that transition costs equal zero). The
argument runs as follows: moving from an existing, out-of-date law
toward a new, ideal law benefits society. The closer one moves to the
ideal law, the better. Expressed this way, the argument is simple
and intuitive. Nevertheless, it will help to work through some
details. I will explain the details with words and a graph.
Imagine again our seven voters.155 It will help to give them
names: j, k, l, m, n, o, and p. The voters range from very conservative
(voter j) to very progressive (voter p). To begin, the law matches
what j likes. Thus, the law makes j happy, but the other six voters
are unhappy. The ideal law—not just for j, but for the seven voters
as a group—lies somewhere in the progressive direction.
Suppose the law moves in the progressive direction a little. This
makes j unhappy; the new law is a little too liberal for him. He loses
–1. But the new law makes the other six voters happier. Each gains
+1, so the net gain is +5.
Suppose the law moves in the progressive direction again. This
makes the two most conservative voters, j and k, unhappy. The new
law is too liberal for their tastes, and they each lose –1 apiece. The
new law, however, makes the other five voters happier. Each gains
+1 for a net effect of +3.
Figure 1 captures these ideas. The x-axis reflects the political
spectrum. The further one moves to the right, the more progressive
law becomes, and vice versa. The voters appear at their preferred
points. The y-axis reflects the collective benefit of updating the law,
which begins at j.156 If law moves from j to k, voter j suffers –1 and
the remaining six voters benefit +6 for a net effect of +5. The curve
shows this net effect. If law moves from k to l, voters j and k suffer
–1 apiece, and the remaining voters benefit +1 apiece for a net effect

See supra Part II.
See supra Section III.A.
156 To simplify, I abuse notation by using the same letters to refer both to people and to the
location of laws.
154
155
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of +3. Again, the curve shows this. Moving from k to l corresponds
to a +3 increase on the curve.
Figure 1: The Modernization Principle
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The ideal law in this example matches the political center, m.
Replacing the outdated law at the fringe of society with a law closer
to the center creates a social benefit, as the curve shows. The closer
one moves to the center, the better. But note the slope of the curve—
it flattens. The benefit grows, but at a decreasing rate. The first step
toward the center (from j to k) helps six people and hurts only one,
the second step (k to l) helps five people and hurts two, and so on.
I call this the modernization principle. As an outdated law is
modernized, meaning its substance evolves from the old status quo
toward what works best for today, society benefits but at a
decreasing rate. The first step in the evolution generates more good
than the last.157
Like all analyses of entrenchment and updating, Figure 1 makes
some assumptions. These assumptions are common and
unobjectionable but somewhat technical, so I explain most of them
in the footnote.158 One assumption, however, should be drawn out.
157 This idea, if not this particular label, is already known to scholars. See, e.g., COOTER,
supra note 8, at 33–34 (explaining the connection between “strong symmetry” in preferences
and social welfare, which together lead to what I call the modernization principle).
158 Figure 1 assumes that the issue is one-dimensional (e.g., tax rates, greenhouse gas
emissions, abortion restrictions); voters are situated symmetrically around the median voter,
m; and voters prefer laws closer to their ideal points, meaning their preferences are singlepeaked and symmetrical. These are common assumptions. See, e.g., DAVID W. BRADY & CRAIG
VOLDEN, REVOLVING GRIDLOCK: POLITICS AND POLICY FROM JIMMY CARTER TO GEORGE W.
BUSH 12–48 (2d ed. 2006); COOTER, supra note 8, at 25–41, 154–61, 215–39; KEITH KREHBIEL,
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Figure 1 assumes that all voters have equally intense preferences.
When law moves rightward, each person who suffers loses exactly
the same amount as each person who gains. I have assumed away
intense minorities.
This assumption simplifies the analysis without limiting it. What
if voter j had intense preferences? When law moves rightward, he
suffers more than anyone else gains or loses. To capture this
intensity, the curve would skew leftward. The curve’s peak, which
corresponds to the ideal law, would be between j and m instead of
directly above m. Different assumptions about who has intense
preferences, and the intensity of those preferences, would move the
peak to other places.
Regardless of the location of the peak, though, the modernization
principle holds. The first step toward the ideal law generates a
greater net benefit than the last.
B. FIXED VERSUS VARIABLE COSTS

I have focused on the benefits of legal transition. Now I will
consider the costs. Transition costs can be fixed or variable.159 A
fixed transition cost arises in a set amount every time law changes
whether the change is minor or major.160 For example, cash
registers must be reprogrammed, which costs the same amount of
time and money whether the sales tax changes by one percentage
point or ten. Likewise, election officials must change their forms and
procedures if the voting age jumps from 18 to 19 or to 29. A change
to entitlement programs might interject a baseline of insecurity for
recipients.
Variable costs accrue with the magnitude of legal change.161 As
the sales tax rises, consumers make increasingly drastic changes to

PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 20–48 (1998); GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO
PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK (Princeton Univ. Press 2002); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights
Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 641–64 (1991); Michael D. Gilbert & Joshua M. Levine, Less
Can Be More: Conflicting Ballot Proposals and the Highest Vote Rule, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 383,
389–93, 398–401 (2009).
159 See supra Part I, p. 73.
160 See supra Part I, p. 73.
161 See supra Part I, p. 73–74.
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their consumption patterns.162 As the voting age rises, politicians
make greater changes to their platforms, and citizens make greater
adjustments to their lives in anticipation of new representation and
policies.163 Slashing Social Security causes more disruption than
trimming it.164
As these examples demonstrate, many costs that accompany
changes to law probably have both fixed and variable components.
Nevertheless, it will help to ignore this complication, at least to
start, and focus instead on the polar cases.
C. ON OPTIMAL LEGAL CHANGE

I have discussed independently the benefits and costs of
modernizing an outdated law. This Section combines the
discussions. To clarify, I use an example with the same seven
voters.165
Suppose the law permits tractors to use low grade gasoline. The
law permits dirty fuel, which is bad. But, by driving down the cost
of running tractors, it promotes food production, which is good. The
law aligns with voter j, who is on the end of the spectrum. Thus,
voter j is happy, but the other six voters are not. They would prefer
a different balance between the environment and food. They would
prefer a law requiring costlier but cleaner fuel.
Suppose that, as above,166 the ideal law aligns with voter m, who
sits in the political center. This is the ideal law as a matter of
substance; it ignores transition costs. Once we account for those
costs, a question arises. Should the law move from j, the political
fringe, toward m, the ideal? Do the benefits exceed the costs?
The ideas above provide a framework for answering those
questions. To begin, suppose that transition costs are variable. The

162 See David R. Agrawal, The Tax Gradient: Spatial Aspects of Fiscal Competition, 7 AM.
ECON. J. 1, 1 (2015) (finding that “[d]ifferences in sales tax rates may lead consumers to crossborder shop”).
163 Cf. Kelsey Piper, The Case for Changing the Voting Age to 0, VOX (Sept. 10, 2019, 7:50
AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/9/10/20835327/voting-age-youth-rights-kidsvote (arguing that lowering the voting age would change how both citizens and politicians
behave).
164 See DEAN BAKER & DAVID ROSNICK, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE IMPACT
OF SOCIAL SECURITY CUTS ON RETIREE INCOME 1–2 (2010) (examining several proposals to
cut Social Security benefits and how each would affect current and future retirees).
165 See supra Section III.A.
166 See supra Section V.A.
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intuition is simple enough: as fuel requirements become
increasingly stringent, the costs of adaptation continually increase.
Meanwhile, benefits shrink. This follows from the modernization
principle: moving law toward the ideal increases benefits at a
decreasing rate.167
Figure 2 makes this clearer. As before, the seven voters appear
on the x-axis. The status quo law aligns with j. Moving the law from
j toward m—adopting a cleaner fuel requirement—would come with
benefits captured by the curve. But it would also come with variable
transition costs reflected in the line VL (the subscript means
“low”).168
Figure 2: Optimal Legal Change
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The benefit curve lies above VL between j and n. This means that
moving the law from j to any point between j and n would be a net
positive. The benefits of modernization exceed the transition costs.
I call the set of points between j and n the welfare set.
Every point in the welfare set represents an improvement over
the status quo of j. Only one point, however, represents the biggest
improvement: l. Starting at j, the move to l would come with the
largest net benefit. At l, the difference between the benefit and the

See supra Section V.A.
To simplify, I assume that variable transition costs are linear. Non-linearity would not
affect the basic analysis as long as the function is monotonic.
167
168
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transition cost is greatest.169 In the example, fuel standards should
move away from the status quo toward the ideal, but they should
not move all the way to the ideal. The transition costs are too high.
Suppose that stability in the law becomes even more valuable.
This is equivalent to saying that transition costs (which I still
assume are variable only) rise. Figure 2 captures this by replacing
VL with VH (the subscript means “high”). Starting at j, any move in
the law comes with a higher cost than before.
The increase in transition costs shrinks the welfare set. Given
costs of VL, the welfare set stretched from j to n. Given costs of VH,
it only stretches from j to l. Every point in the new welfare set
represents an improvement over the status quo. The point
representing the biggest improvement is k. Starting at j, and given
transition costs of VH, the move to k would come with the largest net
benefit.
To generalize, when variable costs increase, the welfare set not
only shrinks, it recedes toward the status quo. This is not a fluke of
this particular example. It follows from the combination of variable
transition costs and the modernization principle. Because of the
variability, larger changes to law come with higher costs. Because
of the modernization principle, larger changes to law come with
diminishing benefits. At some point, the costs overtake the benefits.
As variable costs rise, that point comes sooner.
Variable transition costs have a straightforward implication:
law should modernize incrementally. As variable costs increase, the
optimal changes to law get smaller and smaller.
Now consider the opposite case: transition costs are fixed. This
means that when law moves from j, a fixed transition cost accrues
in the same amount, regardless of whether it moves near or far. To
clarify with the tractor example, suppose that any change in the fuel
standard will necessitate an engine modification. The modification
costs the same amount whether the fuel standard changes a lot or a
little.
Figure 2 captures the fixed transition cost with the flat, dashed
line labeled FL. The benefit curve lies above FL between k and o.
This means that moving the law from j to any point between k and
o would be a net positive. The point with the greatest net payoff is
m. In the tractor example, fuel standards should move from the

169

To restate, the distance between the curve and the line VL is maximized at l.
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status quo all the way to the ideal. This is intuitive: the fixed cost is
the same whether the law moves a little (so there is a small
modernization benefit) or the law moves a lot (so there is a large
modernization benefit). Society is better off with the larger benefit.
Suppose that stability in the law becomes even more valuable.
This is equivalent to saying that transition costs (which I still
assume are fixed only) rise. Figure 2 captures this by replacing FL
with FH. From the status quo of j, any change in law comes with a
higher cost than before. The increase in transition costs shrinks the
welfare set. Now it only stretches from l to n. The welfare set has
shrunk, but the optimal change to the law remains the same. The
point with the greatest net payoff is m.
To generalize, when fixed costs increase, the welfare set not only
shrinks, it collapses on the ideal law. This follows from the
combination of fixed transition costs and modernization benefits.
Because costs are fixed, large changes to law are no costlier than
small changes. Because more modernization means more benefit—
the curve keeps sloping up, albeit at a diminishing rate—the largest
benefit accrues when law moves from the status quo to the ideal.
Fixed transition costs have a straightforward implication: law
should modernize fully. Given fixed transition costs, the optimal
change to law requires moving from the status quo to the modern
ideal, even if that means drastic change.
To summarize, the optimal change to an outdated law depends
critically on the nature of the transition costs involved. If those costs
are variable, the old law should move incrementally toward the
modern ideal. A small step is best. If transition costs are fixed, the
old law should move all the way to the modern ideal. A relatively
large step is best.
Three clarifications are in order. First, the analysis has assumed
that the outdated law should change—that there are some
alternatives to the status quo for which the benefits of modernizing
law exceed the costs (in other words, there is a welfare set). In
reality, this is not always the case. Sometimes the costs of a legal
transition, whether variable or fixed, must be so high that they
exceed the benefit. In such cases, the law, though outdated, should
of course remain in place.
Second, I have assumed that transition costs are purely variable
or purely fixed. In reality, most legal transitions probably come with
both kinds of costs. This does not fundamentally alter the analysis.
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To see why, imagine a new cost line on Figure 2. To capture fixed
costs, the line begins above j, not on top of j. To capture variable
costs, the line slopes upward, so costs increase as law moves further
from j. As this imaginary cost line gets steeper—as variable costs go
up—the optimal change to law gets closer to the status quo. The
optimal step is smaller. As this imaginary cost line shifts upward—
as fixed costs go up—the optimal change to law stays the same.
Combining costs complicates the analysis, but it does not change the
basic conclusion. The optimal change to law is relatively small given
variable costs and relatively large given fixed costs.
Third, I have written as though both transition costs and
modernization benefits accrue once. But this is too simple. While
transition costs plausibly accrue once, modernization benefits are
ongoing. Future work could address this complication. For now, I
sidestep it by simply assuming that the costs and benefits described
and graphed above reflect present values. In other words, they
capture all present and future costs and benefits.
D. THE TRANSITIONS THEOREM

The previous Section analyzed what changes should be made to
law. An outdated law should change if the modernization benefits
exceed the transition costs. This Section analyzes legal design. The
question is: what kind of amendment procedure will facilitate those
net-beneficial changes? As discussed, we cannot rely on people to
get this right on their own, at least not when the transaction costs
of bargaining are high. We need to impose a solution in the form of
a well-designed amendment rule.
Finding such a rule, it turns out, is harder than it seems. The
rule that works well given variable transition costs might fail given
fixed costs. To see why, return for the last time to our seven
voters.170 The status quo law is outdated; it aligns with voter j, who
is on the fringe. Law can move from j and, in doing so, create a net
benefit. Where exactly the law should go depends on transition
costs. Figure 3—the top-half of which just summarizes Figure 2—
illustrates. If transition costs are variable and low, then law should
move from j to some point in the space labeled “welfare set VL.”
Every point in that set represents a net-beneficial change in law (of
those, the darkened point represents the best change in law). If
170

See supra Section III.A.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

37

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 3

98

[Vol. 54:61

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

transition costs are fixed and low, then law should move from j to
some point in the space labeled “welfare set FL.” And so on.
Figure 3: The Paradox of Entrenchment

Welfare set FH
Desirable
legal
change

Welfare set FL
Welfare set VH
Welfare set VL
j

k

l

m

n

o

p
Win set 4/7ths

Possible
legal
change

Win set 5/7ths
Win set 6/7ths

We know where law should go; where can it go? The answer
depends on the amendment rule. Suppose someone proposes to
replace the status quo law at j with a new law at o. This represents
a big swing from one end of the spectrum to the other. If a bare
majority, meaning just four of seven voters, can change the law,
then the proposal will pass. Four voters—m, n, o, and p—prefer o
because it lies closer to them than the status quo.171
The point o is not the only alternative that would defeat j. Every
point in the space labeled “win set 4/7ths” would defeat j in a vote
under majority rule. That space is very wide, spanning the entire
range of preferences. Majority rule gives the voters maximum
flexibility.172
Now change the amendment rule. Instead of four votes, suppose
it takes five to change the law. The voters use a supermajority rule,
a common form of entrenchment. In this scenario, the proposal to

To simplify, I assume voters do not vote strategically.
The wide win set follows from the median voter theorem. See generally DUNCAN BLACK,
THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958) (setting forth the “median voter
theorem”); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (providing a
descriptive account of party politics and voter behavior); KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING
POLITICS 91–99 (2d ed. 2010) (articulating majority rule through geometric models). Although
the win set is wide, the unique equilibrium lies at m, assuming no agenda setting power. This
is irrelevant for my purposes.
171
172
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replace j with o will fail. Only four voters, m, n, o, and p, prefer o.
The other three voters prefer j.
This does not mean the law is stuck at j. Consider a proposal to
enact m. Five voters, l, m, n, o, and p, prefer m to j, so this proposal
will pass. To generalize, every point in the “win set 5/7ths” would
defeat j under a 5/7ths voting rule.
Consider a final possibility: deep entrenchment. It takes six votes
to change the law. In this scenario, the proposal to replace j with o
will fail, as only four voters, m, n, o, and p, prefer o. Likewise, the
proposal to replace j with m will fail, as only five voters, l, m, n, o,
and p, prefer m. Given a 6/7ths voting rule, law cannot move from j
to the political center. The furthest it can go is l. Every point in the
“win set 6/7ths,” and nothing else, would defeat j under a 6/7ths
voting rule.
The win sets at the bottom of Figure 3 display a pattern.173 As
entrenchment deepens, the win sets get smaller. Not only do they
get smaller, they collapse on the status quo. From j, law can change
a lot under majority rule, some under a 5/7ths rule, and very little
under a 6/7ths rule.
To see the intuition behind this result, return to a simpler
version of the fuel example. Suppose the status quo law requires
fuel to have a cleanliness rating of 9, which is low. Three legislators
have authority to change it. They prefer ratings of 10, 20, and 30,
respectively. If the legislators make decisions using majority rule—
the law is not entrenched—they may make the rating 20. Two of
three legislators prefer 20 to 9. If, however, the legislators require
unanimous agreement to change the rating—the law is
entrenched—they cannot make such a drastic move because the
first legislator opposes it. That legislator may support an
incremental increase from 9 to 10, but not a substantial increase to
20. The deeper the entrenchment, the smaller the possible change.
These ideas uncover the power and the paradox of entrenchment.
Start with the power. We already understand that when legal
transitions are sufficiently costly, law should not change, and
173 I study this pattern at length elsewhere. Gilbert, supra note 16, at 654–71; see also
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 147, at 1148–58 (presenting spatial models of
supermajority rule). Neither of those articles relates voting patterns under majority and
supermajority rule to transition costs, which is the focus here. To simplify, the win sets in
Figure 3 are drawn with the assumption that voters do not consider transition costs when
voting. The Appendix shows that this does not affect the basic analysis. See infra app.
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entrenchment tends to stop it from changing. This is the first virtue
of entrenchment. But entrenchment has a second virtue as well.
Suppose that the law should change. Despite the transition costs,
modernization would, on balance, be beneficial. If transition costs
are variable, law should change incrementally—which
entrenchment forces it to do.
To visualize the argument, return to Figure 3. When variable
transition costs increase, the solid welfare sets collapse on the
status quo at j. When entrenchment deepens, the win sets collapse
on the status quo at j. The changes to law we should make
correspond to the changes to law we can make.
This analysis uncovers a deep and novel logic for entrenchment.
Not only can entrenchment prevent law from changing when,
because of transition costs, law should not change. Entrenchment
can encourage exactly the right adjustments when law should
change. Given variable transition costs, incremental change is best,
and entrenchment promotes incremental change.
Now consider the paradox of entrenchment. Suppose that the law
should change, as modernization would on balance be beneficial. If
transition costs are fixed, law should change drastically—but
entrenchment prevents drastic change.
Figure 3 shows the problem. When fixed transition costs
increase, the dashed welfare sets collapse on the optimal law, m.
When entrenchment deepens, the win sets collapse on the status
quo, j. A wedge opens between the changes to law we should make
and the changes to law we can make. To see this starkly, suppose
fixed transition costs are high and the voters use a 6/7ths voting
rule, meaning entrenchment is deep. The top welfare set shows the
beneficial changes to law, and the bottom win set shows the possible
changes to law. They do not overlap. Every possible change to the
law—every proposal that six of seven voters would support—would
create more costs than benefits.
This uncovers a deep and novel flaw in entrenchment.
Entrenchment can prevent law from changing when, because of
transition costs, law should not change. But entrenchment can
encourage exactly the wrong adjustments when law should change.
Given fixed transition costs, major change is best, but entrenchment
prevents major change.
To appreciate the depth of the paradox, consider a thought
experiment. A status quo law is outdated. A legal designer with
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power to choose an amendment rule for that law is told that legal
stability is very valuable. In other words, transition costs are high.
The legal designer’s intuition is to deepen entrenchment to keep the
law steady. But if transition costs are fixed, this intuition might lead
to exactly the wrong decision. If the law is going to change for the
better, it must change a lot, not a little. To ensure the law can
change a lot, the best decision for the designer might be to entrench
less, not more.
I capture these ideas with the Transitions Theorem: variable
costs support smaller legal change and deeper entrenchment; fixed
costs support larger legal change and shallower entrenchment. As
the theorem makes plain, optimal entrenchment is contingent. It
depends on the nature of the transition costs involved.
E. A GENERALIZATION

The prior sections worked out ideas with seven voters and one
mechanism of entrenchment, a supermajority rule. In reality, there
are often many more voters, and they operate under different (and
sometimes multiple) entrenchment mechanisms: bicameralism,
presentment, filibusters, and so on. Those complications do not
change the basic analysis. Amending entrenched law requires a
certain number of actors (voters, legislative chambers, executives)
to agree. The greater the number of actors who must agree, the
smaller the possible change from the status quo.174 Meanwhile,
changing the mechanism of entrenchment does not alter the
analysis of transition costs. Variable costs support incremental
change, while fixed costs support larger change. The presentation
above is simple, but the analysis is general.
VI. THE ECONOMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The analysis above develops general ideas with broad
applications. This Part narrows the focus. It addresses a particular
question, albeit one close to the hearts of many legal scholars: how
to change the U.S. Constitution? Because of its generality, the
analysis above can contribute to an answer. I do not purport to
provide an all-things-considered answer, but I am able to make
174 See Gilbert, supra note 16, at 649–51. This is the central insight of an important book:
TSEBELIS, supra note 158.
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some progress, in part by pointing out weaknesses in existing
accounts.
Originalists and some others tend to support the demanding
amendment rules in Article V, and they tend to oppose efforts by
judges to sidestep those rules through interpretation.175 The
analysis here provides some tools to assess this broad view. If the
status quo that the amendment rules protect is not too far from the
ideal law (typically originalists and others present no evidence on
this score), if transition costs are sufficiently high (same), and,
critically, if those costs are mostly variable in character (a
distinction originalists and others ignore), then their position is
strong—stronger than they know. Under these facts, the deep
entrenchment of Article V not only freezes most of the U.S.
Constitution in place, it encourages amendments to be incremental,
which is optimal given those variable costs. If these conditions fail
to hold, then their position weakens. If transition costs are mostly
fixed, then Article V encourages harmful changes and discourages
beneficial changes.
Living constitutionalists and some others face the opposite
criticism. Their calls for faster, grander legal change, whether
through amendment or judicial interpretation, ring true when the
status quo is far from today’s ideal law, transition costs are low, and,
critically, those costs are mostly fixed. They usually offer no
evidence on these scores. If transition costs are mostly variable,
then legal change should be small and their prescription reversed.
In that case, deep entrenchment—even as it protects an unpopular
status quo, even as it promotes plodding legal change—gets it
exactly right.
These narratives often address Article V as a whole. Some
scholars might want to claim that Article V overall is too strict, too
lenient, or just right.176 Such positions seem untenable. One can
mitigate this problem by assessing Article V case-by-case rather
than as a whole. More generally, one can lessen the challenge of
entrenchment design by having different amendment rules for
different laws. It must be easier to get the rule right case-by-case
175 Like this Article, many of their arguments are rooted in consequentialism. See, e.g.,
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 53, at 19 (“Our normative approach to constitutions and
interpretation is welfare consequentialist.”).
176 Cf. id. at 202 (“Only an uninhibited Article V that fully engages the whole people can
ensure that changes in our fundamental law reflect the crystallized consensus of their
views.”).
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than in the aggregate. Perhaps this explains why the U.S.
Constitution has a higher threshold for amending some parts than
others.177 Likewise, this may justify why California has a lower
voting threshold for constitutional “amendments” than
constitutional “revisions.”178 The analysis here supports
heterogeneity in voting rules, and it casts light on how to design
them.
Rather than varying the voting threshold, one could vary the
process. Article V provides two methods for changing the U.S.
Constitution: amendments and conventions.179 Amendments
generally proceed issue-by-issue, foreclosing bargaining across
issues,180 while conventions promote bargaining across issues. This
distinction is critical. When citizens can bargain across issues,
entrenchment does not constrain legal change to the same degree.
A person otherwise opposed to changing the law on X may approve
a significant change to it if she gets a law on Y in exchange. Thus,
conventions offer a way out of misalignment. That problem arises
when entrenchment promotes incremental change but, because of
fixed transition costs, only drastic change is beneficial. Through
bargaining in a convention, one can make that large, beneficial
change, even with deep entrenchment. This generates a proposition:
given deep entrenchment, lawmakers should use amendments
177 Article V provides a supermajority rule for amending most of the U.S. Constitution but
effectively an unanimity rule for amending the provision granting states equal representation
in the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
178 See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (describing initiative measures in California); id. art. II, § 10
(establishing the effectiveness of provisions passed or amendments made through referenda);
id. art. XVIII (establishing California’s constitutional amendment procedures). On
constitutions with multiple amendment rules, see Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Tiered
Constitutional Design, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 438, 442 (2018) (proposing a “tiered design” for
understanding the Constitution to avoid rigidity or amorphousness in analysis).
179 See U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing that conventional amendments require support
from state legislatures, while changes proposed by a convention may require support from
state conventions).
180 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 7, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[E]very
amendment to the Constitution . . . would be a single proposition . . . . There would then be
no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any other point—no giving nor
taking.”). Legislators often pass multi-issue bills, but multi-issue amendments are rarer. This
is in part because of “single subject rules,” which exist worldwide. See generally Cooter &
Gilbert, supra note 126 (discussing the single subject rule as applied to constitutional
initiatives); Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single Subject
Adjudication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 345–46 (2011) (finding evidence that single subject rules
deter multi-issue initiatives); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative
Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006) (discussing the single subject rule as applied to
legislation in the American states).
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when transition costs are variable and conventions when transition
costs are fixed.
Separate from amendments and conventions, judicial updating
offers a third process for changing entrenched law. To illustrate, the
text of a constitution can change to grant same-sex couples a right
to marry, or judges can interpret existing text to grant that right,
as the U.S. Supreme Court did in Obergefell v. Hodges.181 These
methods of change are linked. When a constitution is entrenched
and difficult to amend, judicial discretion—and therefore the
capacity to update—grows.182
Scholars have long debated the merits of judicial updating.183
One group claims that Article V provides the exclusive mechanism
for changing the U.S. Constitution and that judicial updating
violates this principle and produces bad results.184 This view is
closely associated with originalism.185 The other side rejects
originalism186 and embraces a more active role for courts. Professor
Strauss, for example, argues that Article V presents “just too
difficult a process” and “living constitutionalism”—meaning judicial
updating—“is inevitable, and necessary.”187 In support of updating,
scholars argue that judges, at least in U.S. federal courts, tend to
update the U.S. Constitution in incremental, common law
fashion.188
In a sense, both sides are wrong. Judicial updating can do more
good than harm. And judicial incrementalism is not necessarily a
virtue. To illustrate, suppose a constitutional provision is badly
outdated. Modernizing it could create more benefits than costs. If
transition costs are variable, then minor change is best. If
entrenchment is deep, then only minor change is possible and there

181 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (finding that the right to marry is fundamental under the
Constitution).
182 COOTER, supra note 8, at 232 (“In general, lowering the obstacles to changing the
constitution, such as requiring a simple majority instead of a super-majority, decreases the
discretionary power of the courts to interpret the constitution.”).
183 See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 53; STRAUSS, supra note 44; Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever,
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 (1996); Vermeule, supra note 61.
184 E.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 53, at 85–99; Scalia, supra note 51, at 854.
185 E.g., Scalia, supra note 51, at 854.
186 But see BALKIN, supra note 44, at 277 (developing a theory of originalism that reserves
a place for judges in constitutional construction).
187 STRAUSS, supra note 44, at 115.
188 See, e.g., id.
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is no need for judicial updating. If, however, entrenchment is
shallow—in California, for example, one can amend the constitution
with a bare majority189—then major change is possible. Lawmakers
who do not understand or care about transition costs might propose
a major amendment. Judges who do understand and care about
transition costs might preempt that amendment with minor
updating. Scholars critique judges for preempting the legislature—
for making a change by fiat instead of letting democracy work. In
this scenario, however, fiat is preferable. As with rights protections,
courts can protect society from the dangers of democracy.
The scenario I just described begs questions of institutional
competence. Compared to legislators, I imagined judges having
better information (or at least caring more) about transition costs.
This will not always, and perhaps only rarely, be true. But imagine
a different scenario. Modernizing the outdated provision could
create more benefits than costs. If transition costs are fixed, then
major change is best. If entrenchment is deep, then only minor
change is possible. If lawmakers do not understand or care about
transition costs, they might enact minor change, harming society. If
they do understand and care about transition costs, they might
propose major change, but it will fail. Judges can correct the
problem with dramatic updating.
This scenario is especially intriguing. It does not require judges
to have better information than legislators. Furthermore, it shows
that judicial incrementalism is not always a virtue. Here, judges
should initiate a major change in law, not a minor one. A proposition
follows. If judges are going to update constitutional text, they should
attend to transition costs. As variable costs increase, they should
temper the pace of legal change, and as fixed costs increase, they
should speed it up.
Claiming that judicial updating can improve social welfare is one
thing; claiming that it does is another. To make that claim requires
strong assumptions about what information courts possess and
what actions they tend to take.190 I do not make that claim. The
objective is not to show that updating necessarily outperforms
amendment, just to show when and why it can.
189 See CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 10 (specifying that a majority of voters can amend the
constitution by initiative).
190 Of course, making the opposite claim—that judicial updating decreases social welfare—
also requires strong assumptions.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

45

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 3

106

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:61

VII. CONCLUSION
Scholars have debated entrenchment for centuries.191 They lob
claims about stability and democratic responsiveness like
artillerymen on the Western Front, making noise but no progress.192
The problem runs deeper than epistemology. It is not a lack of
information about the values of stability and responsiveness—in the
language above, modernization benefits and transition costs—that
stalemates the debate, though that problem looms large. More
fundamentally, we lack theory. Without data, theory becomes more
important, not less. It must be better to have poor information and
clear theory than poor information and no theory. Using law and
economics, this Article provides the beginnings of a clear theory of
entrenchment.

191
192

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
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VIII. APPENDIX
Section V.D developed the Transitions Theorem with the aid of
Figure 3, which includes win sets. To simplify, those win sets
assumed that voters do not account for transition costs when
deciding whether to support or oppose legal change. That
simplification does not change the basic analysis, as this appendix
shows.
In Figure A1, the status quo law equals j. Changing the law
would create benefits captured by the curve. Total transition costs
borne by all citizens are indicated by the line TC. The welfare set
stretches from k to m. The figure includes two new features. First,
it shows the benefits of legal change for three individual voters, k, l,
and m. Voter k’s benefit is captured by the triangle that peaks above
k. Moving law from j to k would increase her payoff by one, and
moving law from k to l would decrease her payoff by one. Citizen l’s
benefit is captured by the triangle that peaks above l. Moving law
from j to k would increase her payoff by one, moving law from j to l
would increase it by two, and so on. Citizen m’s benefit peaks above
m. Similar triangles could be drawn for the other citizens. Second,
the figure shows pro rata transition costs with the dashed line PC.193
As law moves rightward from j, every citizen pays that pro rata cost.

193

Multiplying PC by seven (because there are seven citizens) yields TC.
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Figure A1
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Consider voter k. As a matter of pure policy preference, she
prefers every point between j and l to a status quo law of j. Once she
accounts for her own transition costs, however, this ceases to be
true. She only prefers points in her welfare set to j. These points
generate enough benefit to offset her transition costs. Figure A1
shows welfare sets for l and m as well, which follow from the same
logic.
The individual welfare sets are nested, meaning each starts at
the same place. Welfare sets for citizens n, o, and p start at the same
place too, though they are not pictured. These welfare sets map onto
win sets. Suppose the voting rule equals 6/7ths. Because the status
quo matches citizen j’s ideal point, she will never support change.
Thus, to change law under this rule requires support from k, l, m,
n, o, and p. The only alternatives that all six of them prefer to j lie
in citizen k’s welfare set. Her welfare set equals the win set under
the 6/7ths rule. Citizen l’s welfare set equals the win set under the
5/7ths rule, and so on.
Now revisit the claims from above. I argued that even rational
citizens who account for transition costs may approve
welfare-reducing changes to law, and Figure A1 supports this.
Every voting rule permits small, harmful changes to law (changes
to points left of society’s welfare set), and the 4/7ths rule permits
large, harmful changes to law (changes to points right of society’s
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welfare set). I argued that given variable transition costs,
entrenchment should deepen, as that causes the range of possible
changes to law to track the range of welfare-enhancing changes.
That idea still holds. As the transition cost lines get steeper
(variable costs increase), the welfare sets recede toward the status
quo, and as entrenchment deepens, the win sets do too. I argued
that given fixed costs misalignment can result. That idea is
apparent in Figure A1. Deepening entrenchment by switching from
a 5/7ths to a 6/7ths rule causes society’s welfare set and the win set
to diverge.
When citizens account for their own transition costs, the analysis
gets richer, but its central features do not change.
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